Building Your Startup Team: Complementarity and Chemistry

Most professional venture investors believe the best predictor of startup success is the quality of the team. Good teams can and do fail, but as team quality drops below “awesome,” the chances for success drop very fast. Thus the cliché that most investors will gravitate to an “A” team with a “B” opportunity over a “B” team with an “A” opportunity.

There are a lot of reasons team quality is so critical to startup success. The incredibly stressful startup environment is the biggest. Startup teams need to accomplish difficult goals with minimal resources in terms of time, capital, and people. Additional stress accrues as outside forces – competitors, markets, technologies, etc. – evolve and force teams to make significant adjustments, often including basic “pivots” (business model, for example) on the fly.

If the extraordinary stresses of the startup environment explain the importance of getting the team right, they also offer a clue to what makes a superior startup team. At the foundational level, what separates the superior startup team from the merely good startup team is complementarity and chemistry.

Complementarity is pretty straightforward in concept, if not always in execution. Within the confines of available resources (financial) and the constraints of team chemistry (more later), you need to make sure the team includes top-tier players at the mission critical startup tasks (i.e. the tasks that need accomplishing in the current round of funding), as well as the flexibility to successfully “wing it” with respect to important ancillary functions.

The trick to building a complimentary team lies in recognition of, and dealing with, the well-established HR principle that when people get to choose who they work with – or who works for them – they tend to choose people like themselves. Now, if you are a founder, and thus most likely very confident of your own near-perfection, that might not seem like a problem. If you’ve got perfection, why not clone it if you can?

Consider if Apple had been founded not by Jobs and Woz, but by Jobs and … Jobs. If you know the Apple story, you know what a catastrophe a Jobs/Jobs founding Apple team would likely have been.

The bottom line is that however perfectly suited you may be for leading your startup to fame and fortune, building a team of clones is seldom the best way to go about it. Instead, look for people with different skill sets. And as much or even more so, different personalities and perspectives on business, technology, and life. The most successful startups – even those like Apple in the years after Jobs returned from exile that were dominated by a leading personality – build leadership teams with diverse skills, experiences, perspectives, and personalities. Just ask Tim Cook.

And that leads to the second, and harder to execute, aspect of assembling a superior startup team: chemistry.

It’s not enough to assemble a team that “covers the waterfront” in terms of skills, experience and personality. You need to make sure those folks can also form very strong bonds with each other (thus the “chemistry” analogy). Because in the constantly changing world of the startup, relationships between key players on the team are going to be under almost constant stress as company circumstances evolve and people have to adjust to changing opportunities and challenges. As anyone who studies morale in the military will tell you, folks in foxholes are motivated more by their loyalty to the folks around them than to “the cause” as such.

On that last point, one of my favorite quotes from an entrepreneur came when he was asked what he would tell his team at the beginning of his next startup journey. He replied: “Folks, we are going on a very long and difficult journey. On this journey, we will carry our wounded – and shoot the deserters.”

The quality of the team has long been the most important factor for most venture capital investors, for good reasons. As you think about assembling your team, particularly in the early days, don’t make the mistake of hiring folks because they look like you, or because they are a perfect skills fit. Look more for folks who compliment your skills and personality – and that look like the kind of people you want on your side when the going gets very tough. Because it almost certainly will, likely many times.


Back to the Future? Venture Investing in Flyover Country

The term “Venture Capital” covers a lot of ground, even when confined to the traditional institutional funds at the heart of the industry. Funds come in many flavors based on factors including stage of investment, industry focus, geography, and propensity to lead or follow in deals.

I’d like to suggest another basis for classifying venture investors, one that I think is absolutely critical when considering the unique opportunities – and challenges – of investing in places outside of the major established centers of venture capital investing. Places like where I grew up, and after twenty years in Silicon Valley and North Carolina, returned to some years back: Wisconsin.

My classification is based on two alternative paradigms for investing capital and managing investments: Nurturing and Managing.

The Manager Venture Investing Paradigm

The Manager paradigm dominates the venture business today (certainly in terms of capital deployed and public mindshare). It is characterized by large funds, many in the billions of dollars (see Softbank’s $100 Billion fund for the current outer limits of the industry) with multiple levels of investment professionals, many of which do not have early stage operating experience or even STEM educational credentials. The “value add” Manager investors provide is largely in terms of the later stages of expansion and exit planning and execution.

The Manager paradigm is ideally-suited to the contemporary Silicon Valley venture capital scene and in terms of number of deals and capital deployed the large majority of Manager paradigm investing occurs in Silicon Valley and a handful of other major venture capital hubs. Today’s large funds simply can’t efficiently make and manage smaller deals. Even those that operate affiliated “seed” funds typically make larger initial investments than their traditional seed fund peers, and limit those investments to deals that they perceive as having mega deal potential (and capital needs) going forward. As a result, the Manager paradigm funds are much less likely to invest in raw entrepreneurs who need a lot of hand-holding on basic operational blocking and tackling. Their deep pockets also make them more likely to focus on capital intensive growth/brand-driven exit metrics than profitability.

Now, the Manager paradigm may get all the headlines, and skew the statistics such that Silicon Valley round deal sizes and valuations or as much as an order of magnitude or even more than the comparable figures in flyover country markets, but it is not the only venture investing paradigm. In fact, it was preceded by a very different and still important, if no longer as publicly prominent, paradigm.

The Nurture Venture Investing Paradigm

The modern venture capital era began in the late 1940s and hit its stride in the 1970s.  Throughout that period, and into the 1980s, even the largest venture capital funds seldom exceeded $100 million and most were only a fraction of that. The prototypical Nurture VC was someone with industry operating experience as well as a STEM education. Further, these smaller funds had minimal junior staff compared to the layers of analysts, directors, junior partners, etc. that make up the bulk of the investment professionals at today’s larger venture funds.

The early decades of the venture business were characterized by something else, besides smaller funds: less experienced entrepreneurial teams. With the industry’s small size, and even with fairly rapid growth in the 1970s, it took awhile for the “serial” entrepreneur to emerge as a regular part of the deal flow. It was probably not until well into the 1990s that most venture-backed Silicon Valley startups included founders and senior managers well-versed in the art of building a high impact company from experience at prior venture backed emerging companies.

When you put all of these factors into a pot and stirred them up, you came up with the Nurture venture investing paradigm. An investment model based on VCs focusing on startups where they could add a lot of value to the deal in terms of the basic nuts and bolts of defining and building the business. Indeed it was a time where the venture investor was often involved – as for example Brook Byers and Genentech – in the actual conception of the business, recruitment of the founding team and formulation of the business plan. Sometimes well before it was even clear there would be any resulting investable deal.

The industry’s structure during the ascendancy of the Nurture paradigm had other implications, among the most prominent of which was the emphasis on profitability as an exit metric. This was not because Nurture investors were any smarter than today’s Manager investors, who by comparison are far less concerned with early profitability. Profitability was part of the Nurture paradigm simply because the typical Nurture fund – even when factoring in syndication of investments – simply did not have sufficient capital to support a portfolio company burning tens or hundreds of millions (or as per Uber recently billions) of dollars of capital a quarter.

The Nurture paradigm led to venture capital’s first golden age in the 1980s. It also sowed the seeds of the Manager paradigm which arrived on the scene in the later half of that decade. The Manager paradigm was launched, ironically enough, when some of the great Nurture firms started raising the first wave of mega funds with hundreds of millions of dollars and, before long, even billions of dollars to deploy.

Implications for Flyover Country Venture Investing

If there is still a meaningful role for Nurture funds in Silicon Valley, there is very little room – today – for Manager-modeled funds outside of Silicon Valley and a handful of other of the larger venture investing centers. And that is something that too many folks in flyover country just don’t understand. And something that is making it even more challenging than it needs to be to foster the emergence of a meaningful high impact entrepreneurship and investing sector in still nascent and emerging flyover markets.

I saw the problem in North Carolina circa 1990, and I see the problem in Wisconsin, today. Regional folks who want to foster a vibrant high impact entrepreneurship and investing community look to Silicon Valley and, seeing how the Manager venture investing model dominates the headlines, conclude that we should be doing the same thing here. That we should invest as if our entrepreneurs had the same kind of “been there, done that” startup experience and networks that their Silicon Valley counterparts enjoy.

Well, they don’t. The opportunities and challenges of venture investing in Wisconsin in 2017 are indeed comparable to the opportunities and challenges of venture investing in Silicon Valley. But Silicon Valley circa 1975, not 2017.

What places like Wisconsin need, in terms of venture investors, is Nurture VCs, not Manager VCs. We need small funds, run by hands-on partners who bring their own “been there, done that” high impact startup operating and investing experience to the game. People who are willing to get down in the trenches with entrepreneurs to help shape raw talent and ideas into fundable deals; and who are willing and able to start doing that even before making an investment. Venture investors who can proactively help their portfolio entrepreneurs achieve profitable operations supporting attractive exit opportunities with lifetime risk capital needs that don’t exceed even the average A round in today’s Silicon Valley.

Unfortunately, instead of Nurture funds led by experienced startup entrepreneurs and hands-on investing professionals helping raw entrepreneurs with good ideas build modest companies that offer solid investment returns with limited capital, what I’ve seen here in Wisconsin is mostly investors with little or no venture backed startup operational or seed/early stage risk capital investing experience casting about for the kind of startup teams and capital-ready deals that fit the Manager venture investing paradigm.  Teams and deals that we just don’t yet have enough of in Wisconsin to support a sustainable high impact venture-driven startup community.

Don’t get me wrong. I think – know – that Wisconsin and places like it have the raw entrepreneurial talent and capital to become small but important and sustainable centers of high impact entrepreneurship and investing. But getting there is not going to happen unless and until the folks who want that to happen understand that right now we need Nurture venture investors, the kind that built Silicon Valley, not Manager venture investors in the mold of those who get the headlines in Silicon Valley today.

Jones: Hard truth about angel investing

Paul Jones, co-chair of Venture Best, the venture capital practice group at Michael Best, has been selected as a regular contributor of OnRamp Labs, a Milwaukee Journal Sentinel blog covering start-ups and other Wisconsin technology news. Paul’s most recently contributed piece, “Jones: Hard truths about angel investing” can be found under their Business Tab in the Business Blog section: Click here to view his latest blog.

A short excerpt can be found below:

“Angel investing is a critical part of the high impact startup world, particularly outside of the big venture capital centers. A good portion of Wisconsin startup success stories achieved liftoff with critical assistance from angel investors and their capital.

But what about the angel investors themselves? How does angel investing work for them?

Well, you don’t have to look very hard to find blogs, books and speakers extolling the virtues of angel investing for the angels. And a lot of them make a pretty good case that the angel investing community makes a nice profit for its efforts. A good case, but also a misleading case.”

Click here to read more.

Those Who Do it All… Shouldn’t

Paul Jones, co-chair of Venture Best, the venture capital practice group at Michael Best, has been selected as a regular contributor of OnRamp Labs, a Milwaukee Journal Sentinel blog covering start-ups and other Wisconsin technology news. Paul’s most recently contributed piece, “Those Who Do it All…Shouldn’t” can be found under their Business Tab in the Business Blog section: Click here to view his latest blog.

A short excerpt can be found below:

“In more than thirty years in and around the high impact entrepreneur and investing space, I’ve come to the conclusion that every entrepreneur, even and in fact particularly the most successful, has at least one serious personality flaw.

One of the more common flaws is the “I can do it all” personality: the entrepreneur who insists that they are not only good at, but the best at everything involved with making their business a success.

What really makes the “I can do it all” entrepreneur so frustrating is not so much that they are almost always wrong about their capabilities. Rather it is that even if an entrepreneur really is the best at everything actually doing everything is still a bad idea.”

Click here to read more.

The Silver Linings in the Fundraising Cloud

Paul Jones, co-chair of Venture Best, the venture capital practice group at Michael Best, has been selected as a regular contributor of OnRamp Labs, a Milwaukee Journal Sentinel blog covering start-ups and other Wisconsin technology news. Paul’s most recently contributed piece, “The Silver Linings in the Fundraising Cloud” can be found under their Business Tab in the Business Blog section: Click here to view his latest blog.

A short excerpt can be found below:

“Entrepreneurs generally think of fund raising as a real drag. For all but the sainted few, it is a time-consuming distraction from growing the business. A bothersome exercise courting folks who think they are smarter than you are (and sometimes are). And all too often at a time the cash clock is rapidly ticking down to zero.

But it’s not all bad. Really. As dark as the fund raising cloud is, there are several silver linings (besides closing on the capital) that make the process useful, if not pleasant. Herewith a couple of those silver linings.

Click here to read more.

SEC Issues Proposed Rules to Increase Financial Thresholds Applicable to Smaller Reporting Companies

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed rules that would amend the definition of a “smaller reporting company” by significantly increasing the applicable financial thresholds. In an effort to promote capital formation and reduce compliance costs for smaller companies while maintaining important investor protections, the proposal to update the definition would expand the number of companies that qualify as smaller reporting companies, thus qualifying for lower levels of required disclosures in prospectuses and periodic filings (such as requiring disclosures for a reduced number of annual periods and the elimination of the need to include risk factor disclosures and certain financial data).

Smaller reporting companies may provide scaled disclosures under the SEC’s rules and regulations. Currently, smaller reporting companies are generally defined as companies that have less than $75 million worth of company shares that are held by the general public (i.e. public float), or companies that have zero public float and annual revenues less than $50 million.

The proposed rules would revise the definition of smaller reporting company to qualify a company with:

  • less than $250 million of public float, or
  • no public float and less than $100 million in annual revenues.

In addition, as in the current rules, once a company exceeds either of the thresholds, it will not qualify as a smaller reporting company again until public float or revenues decrease below a lower threshold. Under the proposed rules, a company would re-qualify as a smaller reporting company again once its public float is less than $200 million (instead of $50 million under the prior rules) or, if it has no public float, once its annual revenues are less than $80 million (instead of $40 million under the prior rules).

However, we should note that the SEC is not proposing to increase the $75 million threshold in the “accelerated filer” definition. Therefore, companies with public float between $75 million and $250 million may qualify as smaller reporting companies, but still be subject to the requirements that apply currently to accelerated filers, including the timing of the filing of periodic reports and the requirement that accelerated filers provide the auditor’s attestation of management’s assessment of internal controls over reporting required by Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (unless a company is an “emerging growth company” under the JOBS Act).

Many smaller companies are challenged to meet the excessive reporting and compliance costs that come with being a public company, which the SEC has estimated to be about $2.5 million for initial compliance costs in the case of an IPO and $1.5 million annually for ongoing compliance. The proposed rules, however, would offer substantial compliance and regulatory cost savings to an expanded number of companies (for example by reducing certain financial and executive compensation disclosures in periodic reports and proxy statements).

This may lead to mid-size companies who are currently reluctant to go public to more readily consider that option. However, companies may remain reluctant to go public due to continuing concerns of an increased potential for claims made by investors and related liability.

Public comment on the proposed rules should be received by the SEC no later than 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.

For more information, please contact your Michael Best attorney; Michael H. Altman at or 414.225.4932; or Daniel J. Gawronski at or 608.283.0124.

Look Before You Leap

Paul Jones, co-chair of Venture Best, the venture capital practice group at Michael Best, has been selected as a regular contributor of OnRamp Labs, a Milwaukee Journal Sentinel blog covering start-ups and other Wisconsin technology news. Paul’s most recently contributed piece, “Look Before You Leap” can be found under their Business Tab in the Business Blog section: Click here to view his latest blog.

A short excerpt can be found below:

Being a high impact entrepreneur is kind of like being a sports star: everybody wants to be one; almost no one credits how much work is involved.

The time “in the spotlight” is like the shining tip of the iceberg: most of the actual work is below the surface, where the environment is mostly cold and dark.

My object here is not to discourage anyone from making the jump to high impact entrepreneurship: we need as many folks at the top of the funnel as we can get. Rather it is more of a “look before you leap” message.

Click here to read more.