The Team Turnover Paradox

I recently had the pleasure of attending a presentation by a very successful Wisconsin-based high impact entrepreneur. His talk included some thoughts on the advantages and disadvantages of building a high impact start-up in “between the coasts” locales with limited access to venture capital. One big advantage, he suggested, was lower employee turnover, which led to lower recruiting, training, and administrative expenses.

He is certainly right about the cost savings of lower team turnover, and thus likely right about the overall positive impact of low turnover on his business. In terms of the regional economy, though, I think his conclusion points more to a problem – low levels of high impact entrepreneurship and investing – than any sort of regional advantage.

I’ve always been intrigued by paradoxes, business and otherwise. So, for example, most venture investors favor jurisdictions, like California, that don’t enforce non-compete agreements. At the same time, when they do a deal in a jurisdiction, like Massachusetts, that does enforce non-competes, they are more than happy to employ them.

Team turnover is another business paradox. On the one hand, pretty much everyone agrees that high employee turnover is a bad thing for any particular business. On the other hand, places with the most dynamic high impact entrepreneurial and investing sectors – Silicon Valley being the obvious example – generally “suffer” from very high turnover rates. What’s not so good for any given tree, it seems, can be pretty good for the forest.

Or, at least, forests where new growth is constantly crowding out the old growth. Places where the “creative destruction” that Joseph Schumpeter said was the distinguishing virtue of capitalism, was most active, as a plethora of “next big things” is always nipping at the heels of yesterday’s headliners.

When you look at turnover in places with substantial high impact start-up sectors, what you see is a lot of folks looking for new opportunities to change the world, as opposed to folks looking for some marginally greener grass in the next break room over. Sure, folks at Apple may move over to Facebook or Google for a better salary, but the real allure for hot-shot employees with outsized ambitions to create wealth and change the world is the opportunity to latch on with what just might be the next Apple, or Facebook or Google. It’s about taking big risks for big payoffs, not chasing the marginal dollar.

And so, as I see it, while the high employee turnover in places like Silicon Valley surely poses tactical challenges for individual businesses, be they start-ups or tech titans, it is a clear strategic advantage for the region taken as a whole. The data, in terms of rates of economic growth, wealth creation and innovation, pretty clearly suggest that the costs of higher team turnover, while no doubt real, are more than compensated for by the benefits. That having a workforce always on the lookout for the next big opportunity – and willing to jump at it despite the risks – is the stuff of outsized innovation and economic performance.

And thus the paradox of high employee turnover. It may be bad for you and me, but it can be very good indeed for us.

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Sorry, But Who You Know Still Matters

We live in an age where “democratization” is all the rage in the world of startup investing. An age where rent-seeking gatekeepers such as venture capitalists are going to be put out of business by Crowdfunding, ICOs, and more generally the mass dissemination of information across the world via the internet. Pretty soon, so the narrative reads, everyone will have access to the best deals, and a new entrepreneurial golden age will emerge. The only thing that will matter is what you know, and John and Jane Doe will be driving the Tesla’s previously consigned to the folks on Sand Hill Road.

Baloney.

The problem with the notions that “everyone will have access to the best deals” and “everyone will be empowered to make the best deals” is that neither assertion is true.

On the first score, the people with the best deals will continue to seek out the investors with the best track records and value-add. I mean, if you are really good and have a really good idea, who would you rather have financing your start-up, Sequoia or some guy named Barney and his pals at the country club in Podunk?

As for the second point, evaluating, making, and managing the best deals is about more than having access to them: it is about having the skills, experience, and networks to recognize them and turn opportunity into achievement. Good venture investors are in fact good at something that is very hard to be good at, not something any old Jane Doe could master if only she had access to the same raw material (most if it garbage in any event). Seriously, pick a name out of the phone book and the chances you’ll find a really good high impact venture investing talent is probably about the same as your finding someone who can hit a major league curveball.

I am not arguing that Crowdfunding and ICOs and the internet generally have not changed and will not continue to change the venture capital business. What I am arguing is that those changes will be evolutionary more than revolutionary; that the fundamentals, including the curation of deal flow, will still be very much in play. And that curation will continue to be one of those “guilt by association” situations driven by relationships, not algorithms.

Look at it this way. Most venture investors see far more entrepreneurs and deals than they can possibly give serious attention to, much less invest in. Further, the best venture investors not only see the most deals generally, but the most good deals as well. There is an awful lot of noise in the system. And for pretty much every venture pro out there, the most logical and effective first noise reduction filter is… who that I respect thought this deal was worth my time to look at?

Deals where the answer to that question is “no one,” aka “over the transom” deals, seldom get more than the most cursory review, and as any honest VC with a solid track record will tell you almost never get done.

Will adding more over the transom deal flow – for example via web solicitation or on public Crowdfunding sites – change that? Of course not. An experienced VC will be no more likely to seriously investigate a deal that comes in over a digital transom than a deal that comes in over a traditional transom.

 

None of this means that Crowdfunding and ICOs and the internet generally are not changing the venture business. But the changes are around the margins – more efficient ways to distribute, access and process information. And these changes are lowering transaction costs, which is great for everyone. But as much as there is more noise in the system, the value of getting a curated introduction to a good investor is if anything more, not less, valuable than it was in the past.

And so, discounting the hype and the bad actors in the Crowdfunding and ICO worlds, the large majority of the good deals are mostly being done by professional investors in closed – even if online – syndicates. And by teams that meet their lead investors via an introduction (likely as not a digital one), not the online equivalent of a billboard.

The point, then, is this: if you are serious about getting your start-up funded by investors that know what they are doing, start talking to folks – other entrepreneurs, service providers, other investors – that are known and respected by those folks. Because no matter how much you know, who you know still matters.

Is Your VC a Chicken or a Pig? Part II: The Role of the Lead Investor – From Term Sheet to Closing (and Beyond)

In Part I we talked about the critical importance of focusing your fund raising efforts on identifying a lead investor – a “pig” – and reaching agreement on a term sheet with them before you spend significant time lining up “chickens” to “follow” along in the deal. Today, we’ll look at what role your lead investor plays post-term sheet agreement when it comes to getting your deal closed.

The first role of the lead investor post-term sheet is working with the company to build out the investment syndicate: that is, to find and close on chickens/followers. The lead becomes, in effect, a part of your pitch team – albeit, without abandoning its primary role as an arms-length investor/skeptic.

The “selling” role of the lead includes identifying, prioritizing, and even pitching potential followers. That typically includes folks the lead brings to the table from its own network as well as appropriate candidates the company suggests. While the company will still be front and center in pitching chickens, the lead is usually the primary due diligence source for potential followers, both “deal” and “legal” due diligence, and actively shares their own thinking on why the deal is compelling with various chickens.

This dual role, working with the company to build the syndicate while also being the principal due diligence resource for the syndicate, makes managing the company/lead relationship complicated as well as critical. The lead, at this point, wants the deal to happen and is committed to making it happen. But only to a point. The lead’s enthusiasm is tempered by its continuing obligation to act in the best interests of its own investors. In addition, its credibility is on the line with other investors, which is something that can cut both ways in terms of how it reacts to any bumps in the road on the journey to closing.

The lead also manages the “deal” part of the deal: that is, the concerns of followers about the terms of the deal. On that score, the lead should focus on convincing followers that the term sheet is “good to go” as is. Indeed, the company should resist any material changes to the term sheet based on follower concerns, just as it would if the lead was the only investor. The whole point of agreeing on a term sheet was to finalize the material terms of the deal. As a practical matter, one or more immaterial changes to accommodate a valuable follower may be acceptable. Any material changes, though, should be viewed as putting in play changes the company might want in exchange, or even grounds for the company backing out of the deal altogether.

The lead also manages the legal process associated with negotiation of closing documents and related legal requirements. Typically, there is one counsel for the investment syndicate, and that counsel works through the lead investor and is paid by the company out of closing proceeds from the financing. (If a follower wants to have an independent legal review, they should pay for it, and that counsel should work through the lead and its counsel in terms of communicating any concerns to the company.) If a lead can’t persuade followers to work through the lead and its counsel, that’s a good sign that the lead is not up to the job.

Once the deal is closed, the lead is usually the “point” investor for the rest of the investment syndicate. If the investors have a director on the Board, it will usually be someone from the lead investor. (Someone that should have been identified at the term sheet stage). When the company has news to share with the investors – good, bad, or indifferent – the lead is usually the first to get it, and often has input on what to share with the rest of the syndicate, when, and how. As with the period of time from the term sheet to the closing, this dual role of investor/advisor can be complex and must be managed carefully.

Lead investors make deals happen, and typically play central roles even after the closing. Smart entrepreneurs know that raising money is first and foremost about getting a credible lead’s name on a solid term sheet. Be a smart entrepreneur: don’t waste time and energy collecting followers until you’ve got a lead for them to follow.

Building Your Startup Team: Complementarity and Chemistry

Most professional venture investors believe the best predictor of startup success is the quality of the team. Good teams can and do fail, but as team quality drops below “awesome,” the chances for success drop very fast. Thus the cliché that most investors will gravitate to an “A” team with a “B” opportunity over a “B” team with an “A” opportunity.

There are a lot of reasons team quality is so critical to startup success. The incredibly stressful startup environment is the biggest. Startup teams need to accomplish difficult goals with minimal resources in terms of time, capital, and people. Additional stress accrues as outside forces – competitors, markets, technologies, etc. – evolve and force teams to make significant adjustments, often including basic “pivots” (business model, for example) on the fly.

If the extraordinary stresses of the startup environment explain the importance of getting the team right, they also offer a clue to what makes a superior startup team. At the foundational level, what separates the superior startup team from the merely good startup team is complementarity and chemistry.

Complementarity is pretty straightforward in concept, if not always in execution. Within the confines of available resources (financial) and the constraints of team chemistry (more later), you need to make sure the team includes top-tier players at the mission critical startup tasks (i.e. the tasks that need accomplishing in the current round of funding), as well as the flexibility to successfully “wing it” with respect to important ancillary functions.

The trick to building a complimentary team lies in recognition of, and dealing with, the well-established HR principle that when people get to choose who they work with – or who works for them – they tend to choose people like themselves. Now, if you are a founder, and thus most likely very confident of your own near-perfection, that might not seem like a problem. If you’ve got perfection, why not clone it if you can?

Consider if Apple had been founded not by Jobs and Woz, but by Jobs and … Jobs. If you know the Apple story, you know what a catastrophe a Jobs/Jobs founding Apple team would likely have been.

The bottom line is that however perfectly suited you may be for leading your startup to fame and fortune, building a team of clones is seldom the best way to go about it. Instead, look for people with different skill sets. And as much or even more so, different personalities and perspectives on business, technology, and life. The most successful startups – even those like Apple in the years after Jobs returned from exile that were dominated by a leading personality – build leadership teams with diverse skills, experiences, perspectives, and personalities. Just ask Tim Cook.

And that leads to the second, and harder to execute, aspect of assembling a superior startup team: chemistry.

It’s not enough to assemble a team that “covers the waterfront” in terms of skills, experience and personality. You need to make sure those folks can also form very strong bonds with each other (thus the “chemistry” analogy). Because in the constantly changing world of the startup, relationships between key players on the team are going to be under almost constant stress as company circumstances evolve and people have to adjust to changing opportunities and challenges. As anyone who studies morale in the military will tell you, folks in foxholes are motivated more by their loyalty to the folks around them than to “the cause” as such.

On that last point, one of my favorite quotes from an entrepreneur came when he was asked what he would tell his team at the beginning of his next startup journey. He replied: “Folks, we are going on a very long and difficult journey. On this journey, we will carry our wounded – and shoot the deserters.”

The quality of the team has long been the most important factor for most venture capital investors, for good reasons. As you think about assembling your team, particularly in the early days, don’t make the mistake of hiring folks because they look like you, or because they are a perfect skills fit. Look more for folks who compliment your skills and personality – and that look like the kind of people you want on your side when the going gets very tough. Because it almost certainly will, likely many times.

Look Before You Leap

Paul Jones, co-chair of Venture Best, the venture capital practice group at Michael Best, has been selected as a regular contributor of OnRamp Labs, a Milwaukee Journal Sentinel blog covering start-ups and other Wisconsin technology news. Paul’s most recently contributed piece, “Look Before You Leap” can be found under their Business Tab in the Business Blog section: Click here to view his latest blog.

A short excerpt can be found below:

Being a high impact entrepreneur is kind of like being a sports star: everybody wants to be one; almost no one credits how much work is involved.

The time “in the spotlight” is like the shining tip of the iceberg: most of the actual work is below the surface, where the environment is mostly cold and dark.

My object here is not to discourage anyone from making the jump to high impact entrepreneurship: we need as many folks at the top of the funnel as we can get. Rather it is more of a “look before you leap” message.

Click here to read more.

What Good VCs (Don’t) Do

Paul Jones, co-chair of Venture Best, the venture capital practice group at Michael Best, has been selected as a regular contributor of OnRamp Labs, a Milwaukee Journal Sentinel blog covering start-ups and other Wisconsin technology news. Paul’s most recently contributed piece, “What Good VCs (Don’t) Do” can be found under their Business Tab in the Business Blog section: Click here to view his latest blog.

A short excerpt can be found below:

Venture capitalists are not the most popular folks in the entrepreneurial community, for a lot of reasons, some of which are understandable if not necessarily good.

At least one reason for not liking VCs is clearly a good one, albeit one that doesn’t apply to most VCs. The reason is this: Some VCs take compensation – cash, equity, etc. – for serving on the Board of Directors of their portfolio companies, or for providing the kind of “value added” mentoring and networking that good VCs routinely provide. That’s just wrong.”

Click here to read more.

Freedom is Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose — sung by Janis Joplin, “Me & Bobby McGee”

Paul Jones, co-chair of Venture Best, the venture capital practice group at Michael Best, has been selected as a regular contributor of OnRamp Labs, a Milwaukee Journal Sentinel blog covering start-ups and other Wisconsin technology news. Paul’s most recently contributed piece, “Freedom is Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose – sung by Janis Joplin, “Me & Bobby McGee” can be found under their Business Tab in the Business Blog section: Click here to view his latest blog.

A short excerpt can be found below:

High impact entrepreneurs come to the arena with a wide range of handicaps their bigger, established competitors largely don’t face.

Startups are notoriously short of capital, talent and time. They typically compete with better-armed, established businesses with ample capital and human resources, and substantial brand equity. It is a wonder, to me, that even a small portion of startups succeed.

But they do. And so you have to ask how. How can small, undercapitalized startups with nothing but ideas and small overmatched teams, in the space of a few short years, not just compete in, but win sizeable markets. They must, it seems to me, have some advantages; some assets that, when properly deployed, more than make up for their obvious liabilities. What are those assets?

Click here to read more.